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Note
"So, What Do You Do Again?": Why the Primary Line
of Business Test Under the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act is "Unfair"
CASEY OLDEN
The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) is a valuable toolfor the
commercial litigator. However, because ofthe statute's vast potential applicability,
courts have historically imposed limitations on the definition of "trade or
commerce." One of these judicially created restrictions is the primary line of
business test, which requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the complained of
conduct occurred in the defendant's primary line of business and not within an
incidental transaction. This enhanced standard serves a gatekeeping function,
striking CUTPA claims before they are considered on the merits.
This Note argues that the Connecticut Supreme Court should finally address
the primary line of business issue directly because the test has no basis in the
statutory text or legislative history. In the course of evaluating this assertion, the
primary line of business precedents are examined critically in a way that no
reported decision has yet undertaken. The Note concludes by suggesting a strategy
for ending the primary line of business inquiry while still honoring its policy goal
to preclude the statute from becoming overly expansive.
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"So, What Do You Do Again?": Why the Primary Line
of Business Test Under the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act is "Unfair"
CASEY OLDEN'
INTRODUCTION
The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) was enacted in
1973 as the State's primary consumer protection law.' The statute was
modeled after the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act); but unlike the
FTC Act, CUTPA provides for both government enforcement and private
rights of action.2 CUTPA is also unique in that it does not require evidence
that the public at large suffered harm.3 The statute was designed to protect
businesses as well as consumers, and thus it is often used as a weapon in
purely private litigation.' If individual litigants can demonstrate that they
suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property,' a wide array of
' University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2017; University of South Carolina,
B.S. 2014. I would like to thank Mr. Robert M. Langer, partner at Wiggin and Dana, for teaching an
insightful course on state unfair trade practice laws. The topics explored in his class inspired this Note
and provided necessary background knowledge. I would also like to thank the Honorable A. Susan Peck
for exposing me to a variety of cases at Hartford Superior Court, as my experience as a legal intern
motivated me to learn more about CUTPA. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their years of
support. The views expressed in this Note are solely mine and should not be imputed to any other party.
1 12 ROBERT M. LANGER ET AL., CONNECTICUT UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES, BUSINESS TORTS AND
ANTITRUST § 1.1, at 1-2 (2015-2016 ed.).
See, e.g., Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 656 A.2d 1009, 1019 (Conn. 1995) ("We
previously have stated in no uncertain terms that CUTPA imposes no requirement of a consumer
relationship. . . . [W]e [have] concluded that 'CUTPA is not limited to conduct involving consumer
injury' and that 'a competitor or other business person can maintain a CUTPA cause of action without
showing consumer injury."' (quoting McLaughlin Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 473 A.2d 1185, 1190
(Conn. 1984))).
4 See LANGER ET AL., supra note 1, § 1.1, at 11, 11 n.75 (explaining how "CUTPA has become a
staple of business litigation in Connecticut").
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-l lOg(a) (2016); see Serv. Rd. Corp. v. Quinn, 698 A.2d 258, 264-65
(Conn. 1997) ("We have never addressed the meaning of the phrase 'ascertainable loss' in a similar
context, in which one business owner claims that another has engaged in an intentional unfair trade
practice that has caused the first business to lose potential customers. Nevertheless, we conclude that, in
the business context, a plaintiff asserting a CUTPA claim may satisfy the ascertainable loss requirement
of § 42-11 Og by establishing, through a reasonable inference, or otherwise, that the defendant's unfair
trade practice has caused the plaintiff to lose potential customers."); Hinchliffe v. Am. Motors Corp., 440
A.2d 810, 814-15 (Conn. 1981) ("Under CUTPA, there is no need to allege or prove the amount of the
ascertainable loss.... To satisfy the 'ascertainable loss' requirement, a plaintiff need prove only that he
has purchased an item partially as a result of an unfair or deceptive practice or act and that the item is
damages become potentially available, including punitive damages, costs
and reasonable attorneys' fees, and injunctive or other equitable relief.'
Connecticut has the largest body of case law interpreting a state
consumer protection statute in the country.' CUTPA was intentionally
written broadly to foster application of the statute to different categories of
commercial transactions slowly over time.' To accomplish this goal, courts
have consistently recognized that CUTPA is "remedial" in nature and "must
be liberally construed."9 Despite this sentiment, many courts have struggled
with the potential sweeping coverage of the statute.o As an example of this
apprehension, the Connecticut Appellate Court adopted a "primary line of
business" test as a prerequisite to maintaining a CUTPA action." This test
requires the proponent of an action to prove that some alleged misconduct
occurred within the suspected wrongdoer's primary trade or business, as
opposed to within an incidental transaction.12
Section I of this Note will demonstrate that the primary line of business
test has no basis in CUTPA's statutory text or legislative history. Section II
will trace the development of the primary line doctrine and argue that it is
flawed. Section IH will offer a suggestion for replacing the primary line of
business test with a better standard. The suggested approach, if followed,
will reduce ambiguity while remaining relatively consistent with precedent.
I. THE PRIMARY LINE OF BUSINESS TEST & CUTPA's STATUTORY
SCHEME
CUTPA provides that "[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
different from that for which he bargained... . The ascertainable loss requirement is a threshold barrier
which limits the class of persons who may bring a CUTPA action seeking either actual damages or
equitable relief").
6 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-llOg(a), (d).
David L. Belt, Unresolved Issues Under the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 82 CONN. B.J. 389, 389
(2008).
8 See Sportsmen's Boating Corp. v. Hensley, 474 A.2d 780, 786 (Conn. 1984) ("The Connecticut
General Assembly deliberately chose not to define the scope of unfair or deceptive acts proscribed by
CUTPA so that courts might develop a body of law responsive to the marketplace practices that actually
generate such complaints.").
9 E.g., Eder Bros. v. Wine Merchants of Conn., Inc., 880 A.2d 138, 149 (Conn. 2005).
1n See, e.g., Nat'l Waste Assocs., LLC v. TD Bank, N.A., No. HHDX07CV106007649S, 2015 WL
7421335, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2015) ("If the court were to credit the plaintiff's argument that
a CUTPA claim could be brought against TD Bank simply because it produces garbage that has to be
removed, then this plaintiff could bring a CUTPA cause of action against nearly any entity or person in
the world because almost everybody produces some type of refuse.").
" See McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 890 A.2d
140, 164 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) ("We accordingly conclude that a CUTPA violation may not be alleged
for activities that are incidental to an entity's primary trade or commerce.").
12 id.
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trade or commerce."' 3 A person is defined as any "natural person,
corporation, limited liability company, trust, partnership, incorporated or
unincorporated association, and any other legal entity," while trade or
commerce "means the advertising, the sale or rent or lease, the offering for
sale or rent or lease, or the distribution of any services and any property,
tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article,
commodity, or thing of value in this state."l4 Connecticut courts use a three-
prong test called the cigarette rule-a name taken from the FTC's early
attempt to regulate cigarettes"-to determine if an act or practice is unfair,
considering:
(1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has
been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-
in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some
common law, statutory, or other established concept of
unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to
consumers, [or competitors, or other businesspersons]. "
The test is disjunctive, meaning unfairness can be established by proving
one of the criteria conclusively or through the presence, to a lesser extent, of
multiple factors.17
It would seem apparent from the text of the statute that an action alleging
an unfair act or practice can be brought against a "person" who is engaged
in "any trade or commerce."" The statute does not qualify trade or
commerce as "primary trade or commerce." Rather, the statute expressly
says "any" trade or commerce and the definition of trade or commerce is
particularly broad.'I Additionally, CUTPA contains an express exemption
13 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-l1 0b(a) (2016).
14 1d. § 42-11 Oa(3), (4).
15 See LANGER ET AL., supra note 1, § 2.2, at 18-19 (describing the history behind the standard);
see also F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244-45 n.5 (1972) (referring to the three
factors for the first time). The FTC no longer uses the cigarette rule. See Artie's Auto Body, Inc. v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 119 A.3d 1139, 1149-50 n.13 (Conn. 2015) ("[F]ederal courts have abandoned
[the cigarette] rule in favor of a more stringent test known as the substantial unjustified injury test....
Under that standard, an act or practice is unfair if it causes substantial injury, it is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition, and consumers themselves could not reasonably
have avoided it."). Connecticut has not yet decided whether to follow the federal decision to alter the
unfairness standard or to keep the cigarette rule. Id.
" Ulbrich v. Groth, 78 A.3d 76, 100 (Conn. 2013) (quoting Harris v. Bradley Mem'l Hosp. &
Health Ctr., Inc., 994 A.2d 153, 173 (Conn. 2010)).
" CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-1 lOb(a) (emphasis added).
19 See LANGER ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.1, at 103-04 (explaining that the definition of trade or
commerce is broad enough to be "so inclusive as to invite the possible conclusion that it extends to
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section, which noticeably fails to mention that the scope of the statute should
be restricted to only conduct within a primary line of business.20
Nevertheless, the primary line of business test is firmly established as the
law under CUTPA,21 despite the absence of statutory language2 2 or
legislative history23 supporting the principle.
II. COMMON-LAW DEVELOPMENT
A. Federal Underpinnings
Having no basis in the statutory text, the primary line of business test is
entirely a common-law creation. The origins of this judicially created
limitation on the scope of CUTPA actually arise from three federal district
court cases. The first, Colonial Motors, Inc. v. New York Design Group,
Inc.,24 is an unreported decision granting the defendant's motion to dismiss
a CUTPA claim brought against it by the plaintiff.25 The defendant had
leased a 1985 Audi from the plaintiff, but was accused of defaulting on the
lease agreement by failing to make payments, converting the automobile
after failing to return it upon demand, and an unfair trade practice under
CUTPA.26 The court assumed for the purposes of the motion that the alleged
conversion of the vehicle was an unfair trade practice under CUTPA, yet
nevertheless concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish that the
challenged unfair act "occurred in the conduct of defendant's 'trade or
commerce."' 27
In reaching this result, the court framed the issue as "whether CUTPA
encompasses a lessee-customer who leases one automobile for use in its
office design business and then converts the automobile to its own use." 28
Despite quoting the exceptionally broad definition of "trade or commerce"
conduct related to any transaction in goods, services, or real property in the state," if courts had not
limited its application in certain situations).
20 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42-1 10c.
21 See infra Section I1.B (tracing the case law).
22 See Metcoffv. NCT Grp., Inc., No. X04CV040184701S, 2005 WL 288769, at *4 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Jan. 10, 2005) ("The CUTPA statute by its terms is not limited to acts or practices conducted in a
defendant's principal business."); Feen v. Benefit Plan Adm'rs, Inc., No. 406726, 2000 WL 1398898, at
*3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2000) ("[T]here is no textual support for the proposition that an unfair act
or practice must be committed in a defendant's principal business to be actionable under CUTPA.");
Belt, supra note 7, at 406 ("Limiting the scope of 'trade' and 'commerce' to the alleged violator's
'primary' trade and commerce finds no support in the language of the Act.").
23 See Feen, 2000 WL 1398898, at *3 (reviewing the legislative history). In fact, the limitation on
trade or commerce seems contrary to the legislature's intention of CUTPA "be[ing] remedial and be[ing]
so construed." CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42-l1 Ob(d).
24 Civil No. H-86-206 (AHN) (D. Conn. June 20, 1986).
25 Id slip op. at 6.
2 6 Id at 1.
27 Id at 3.
28 Id at 3-4 (emphasis added).
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found in Connecticut General Statutes Section 42-110a(4) and
acknowledging that the defendant leased the vehicle for use in its business,
the court found the fact that the defendant was not in the trade or business
of leasing automobiles dispositive. 29  The legal justification for this
conclusion appears to derive from the lack of any Connecticut state court
case at the time permitting a retailer to sue a customer for a violation of
CUTPA.30
The court in the second case, Arawana Mills Co. v. United Technologies
Corp.,'31 relied exclusively on the holding in Colonial Motors to dismiss a
CUTPA claim brought by a plaintiff-lessor against a defendant-lessee.3 2 in
Arawana Mills, the defendant corporation overhauled and serviced jet
engines on property it leased from the plaintiff.33 The plaintiff alleged that
during this time the defendant significantly contaminated the soil and
groundwater on the property by discharging hazardous chemicals.3 4 The
plaintiff brought numerous environmental and common-law causes of
action, including a CUTPA claim.
The defendant moved to dismiss the CUTPA count, arguing that it was
only in the business of repairing aircraft engines and not in the trade of
leasing property.3 6 Therefore, the defendant's act of leasing property from
the plaintiff was not conduct within their "trade or commerce."37 The court,
relying on Colonial Motors, agreed by stating: "Certainly, defendant's act
of leasing property from plaintiff is incidental to the conduct of its true
business on the [p]roperty, the repair and servicing of aircraft engines."38
Neither Colonial Motors nor Arawana Mills expressly uses the phrase
"primary line of business," but Arawana Mills is the first case to use the
now-common word "incidental" when examining conduct that is not
actionable under CUTPA.
Arawana Mills was later discussed and applied favorably in a third case,
29 Id. at 3-5. The court clarified in a footnote that even if the plaintiff amended the complaint to
add "that [the] defendant entered into the lease agreement in the course of its trade or business," the
decision would not turn out differently "because [the] defendant is not in the business of leasing
automobiles." Id. at 5.
30 Id. at 5-6. This fear of applying CUTPA in the reverse to a non-traditional situation makes a
more influential appearance-albeit surreptitiously placed in a footnote-in the next case that further
developed the primary line of commerce test. See Arawana Mills Co. v. United Techs. Corp., 795 F.
Supp. 1238, 1252-53 n. 14 (D. Conn. 1992) (emphasis in original) ("CUTPA is more likely aimed at the
activities of lessors, since . . .. [i]t is fair to say that lessees are usually members of the 'public' and
'consumers' that CUTPA is meant to protect, rather than to regulate.").
' 795 F. Supp. 1238 (D. Conn. 1992).
32 Id. at 1252-53.
33 Id. at 1240.
34 Id. at 1240-41.
35 Id. at 1241-42.
36 1d. at 1252.
37 Id.
" Id. at 1253 (emphasis added).
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Cornerstone Realty, Inc. v. Dresser Rand Co.39 In Cornerstone Realty, the
intended buyer of commercial property sued the prospective seller following
a failed real estate transaction.40 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
violated CUTPA by engaging in a pattern of bad faith conduct in an "attempt
to transfer environmentally contaminated properties to unsuspecting
purchasers."' After reviewing the facts in Arawana Mills, the court held that
"[t]he CUTPA claim should be dismissed because the allegations cannot
support a finding that [the defendant's] attempt to sell the Windsor property
occurred in the conduct of its primary trade or commerce.'42
The plaintiff advanced three arguments in an attempt to distinguish
Arawana Mills. First, they argued that the defendant's trade or commerce in
Connecticut was only the sale of real estate, as the commercial property in
question was no longer in operation.43 The court dismissed this argument by
finding that the defendant had substantial manufacturing and industrial
activities elsewhere, thus "[t]he sale of a manufacturing facility that is no
longer in operation would therefore be incidental to [the defendant's]
business of manufacturing."" The second argument related to this
jurisdictional question, as the plaintiff tried to argue that the court should
only consider activities taking place within Connecticut for purposes of
evaluating a company's primary trade or commerce-an argument that did
not persuade the court.45 Finally, the plaintiff attempted to argue that limiting
CUTPA to one's primary trade or commerce was contrary to the legislative
intent of liberally construing the statute in a remedial way.4 6 The court did
acknowledge that it must predict how the Connecticut Supreme Court would
rule on this issue.47 However, after citing a few Superior Court decisions,
the court "agree[d] with the principle that a CUTPA violation may not arise
out of conduct that is merely incidental to the performance of one's trade or
commerce." 48
B. State Precedent
After the federal precedent developed sequentially in Colonial Motors,
Arawana Mills, and Cornerstone Realty, Connecticut state courts struggled
' 993 F. Supp. 107 (D. Conn. 1998).
4 Id. at 109-10.
Id. at 111 (citation omitted).
42 Id. (emphasis added).
43 Id. at 111-12.
"Id at 112.
46 Id.
47 Id.
4 Id. at 112-13.
1336 CONNECTICUTLA W REVIEW [Vol. 49:1329
with whether to apply the emerging primary line of business doctrine.49 A
split of authority developed, with some Superior Courts adopting the
principleso while others applied a broader "business context" test instead."'
Perhaps in recognition of the growing divide, the Connecticut Appellate
Court addressed the issue in McCann Real Equities Series XXI, LLC v.
David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc.5 2
In McCann, the plaintiffs contracted to purchase four acres of real estate
from the defendants with the intent to construct a supermarket on the
property.53 The defendants used the space as part of their car sales and
service business, which included oil changes.54 The plaintiffs conducted
environmental testing on the property prior to the closing, which highlighted
some environmental concerns but otherwise showed no "significant
contamination."" However, approximately two and a half years after the
closing, the Department of Environmental Protection informed the plaintiffs
that the soil on the property was contaminated and ordered remediation
measures to take place." The plaintiffs brought many causes of action
against the defendants in order to help finance the remediation costs,
including a CUTPA claim." At trial, after the plaintiffs' presentation of
' See Bridgeport Harbor Place 1, LLC v. Ganim, No. X06CV040184523S, 2006 WL 493352, at *5
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2006), on reconsideration, No. X06CV040184523S, 2006 WL 852315, at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2006) (explaining initially that the primary line of business test should not
apply to CUTPA, but nevertheless later granting a motion to strike by applying the rule following the
appellate court's confirmation of its applicability). Compare Feen v. Benefit Plan Adm'rs, Inc., No.
406726, 2000 WL 1398898, at *2-6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2000) (rejecting an earlier court's analysis
in essentially the same case and refusing to apply the primary line of business test), with Feen v. Benefit
Plan Adm'rs, Inc., No. CV 970406726S, 1999 WL 33972, at *6-7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 1999)
(applying the primary line of business test in granting a motion to strike a CUTPA count).
so See, e.g., Advest, Inc. v. Carvel Corp., No. CV 98-0585401S, 1999 WL 786357, at *4 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 1999) ("The court finds that the line of state and federal cases which focuses on
whether the alleged acts occurred as a part of a defendant's primary business is most applicable to the
present action.").
1 See, e.g., Duncan v. PEH 1, No. CV020817088S, 2003 WL 1962789, at *2-3 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Apr. 1, 2003) ("The Connecticut Supreme Court has not yet interpreted the 'trade or commerce' provision
of CUTPA, and Superior Court cases addressing the issue have reached two diverging views in
determining the definition of 'trade' or 'commerce.' Some cases have applied the analysis used by the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, which held that where the actions of the
defendant are incidental to its primary business, it cannot be liable under CUTPA.. .. Conversely, other
Superior Court cases have followed the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
interpreting the Massachusetts Unfair Trade Practices Act. These cases found that under a CUTPA claim,
a transaction need not take place in the defendant's ordinary course of business so long as it takes place
in a 'business context.' . . . The court . . . finds that, unless otherwise determined by the legislature or
appellate authority, the 'business context' test is the applicable standard to apply to CUTPA claims.").
52 890 A.2d 140 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
s1 Id. at 144-45, 150.
5 4 Id. at 150.
* Id. at 150-52.
s'Id. at 145.
5 1 Id. at 146-47.
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evidence, the court granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict."
On the CUTPA issue, the trial court based its decision on a causation
problem; it held that the plaintiffs failed to show how alleged
misrepresentations made by the defendants were the proximate cause of the
loss. 9 Curiously, the Appellate Court did not review the CUTPA issue on
the same ground. Instead, the court appears to have picked up one sentence
from the defendants' appellate brief that said:
In this case, the Plaintiffs failed to establish that the
Defendants' actions were carried out in the course of their
primary trade or business, and not merely incidental to the
Defendants' trade or business. Cornerstone Realty, Inc. v.
Dresser Rand Co., 993 F. Supp. 107 (D. Conn. 1998) (where
a sale of contaminated property was not defendant's primary
business).60
The defendants' brief then went on to discuss other topics." It did not
cite Cornerstone Realty again, and only cited Arawana Mills once as part of
a long string citation standing for a different, general proposition.62 Also of
note, the plaintiffs' reply brief did not mention either of these cases once, or
even acknowledge the primary line of business test.6 3 Despite the trial court
not addressing the question and neither party adequately briefing the issue,
the Appellate Court decided to consider the viability of the primary line of
ssId at 145.
* Id. at 162. The first misrepresentation that the plaintiffs claimed they relied on was that when
asked about a large amount of liquid in a basement area on the property, the defendant allegedly stated
that it was .'only rainwater' and that the two aboveground storage tanks had never been used." Id. at
151. Even assuming these representations were made, the Appellate Court agreed with the trial court in
concluding that the plaintiffs could not establish that these statements caused their loss because they
already knew from their own experts' reports that the representations were false. See id. at 158-59
(emphasis in original) ("It was not the fact that the soil was contaminated that was a problem, but the
amount ofcontamination. There is no evidence that the defendants were in a position to know the extent
of contamination, had made any representation as to that fact or prevented the plaintiffs from conducting
the appropriate tests."). The second alleged misrepresentation involved the defendants' failure to disclose
letters they received from the Department of Environmental Protection between the years of 1994 and
1997. Id. at 154. The Appellate Court again agreed with the trial court in finding that the letters were
"wholly unrelated" to the plaintiffs' claims; thus, failing to disclose the letters could not have been a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs' damages. Id. at 155-56.
o Brief of the Defendant-Appellee at 24, McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David
McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 890 A.2d 140 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (No. 26347), 2005 WL 5808552, at
*24; see also McCann, 890 A.2d at 163 ("[T]he defendants argue that to constitute a violation of CUTPA,
the alleged offense must arise out of the offenders' primary trade or business, not out of an incidental
matter.").
" Brief of the Defendant-Appellee, supra note 60, at 23-26 (raising issues such as simple breach
of contract, lack of an unfair or deceptive practice, and causation problems).
62 Id. at 24.
63 See Reply Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant at iii, McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v.
David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 890 A.2d 140 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (No. 26347), 2005 WL 5808554,
at *iii (containing a table of authorities).
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business test "pursuant to the supervisory powers granted ... by our rules of
practice in order that justice may be done."64
The McCann court first provided a brief overview of both Arawana
Mills and Cornerstone Realty."5 Then, without a mention of CUTPA's
statutory text or any underlying policy concerns, the court adopted the same
primary line of business test found in the federal case law. 6 6 The court
justified its decision with a conclusory statement that the "legislature is
presumed to be aware ofjudgments that construe our statutes. In the absence
of any legislation to reverse the [Arawana Mills and Cornerstone Realty]
decisions, we may assume that the General Assembly is in agreement with
them."67 Lastly, the court easily upheld the directed verdict as to the CUTPA
count "[b]ecause the defendants in this case were not in the business of
selling real property, and the purchase and sale agreement at issue was
merely incidental to the defendants' sale and servicing of automobiles."68
A few years later, the McCann holding was used by the Appellate Court
in Sovereign Bank v. Licata6 1 to further expand the influence of the primary
line of business test. In Sovereign Bank, the substitute plaintiff Seven Oaks
entered into a forbearance arrangement with the defendant, agreeing not to
continue with a foreclosure action against the defendant's property provided
that the balance due on a mortgage was settled within a year.70 This condition
was ultimately not met, and Seven Oaks renewed the foreclosure action.71
One of the defendant's three counterclaims alleged that certain conduct of
Seven Oaks constituted a violation of CUTPA.7 2 A jury found in favor of the
defendant on the CUTPA count, awarding $300,000 in damages plus the
trial court's imposition of $90,130.75 in attorneys' fees.
On appeal, Seven Oaks argued that the relevant transaction involved
conduct that was "incidental to its primary business." 74 The Sovereign Bank
court found no controversy with the applicable law, citing McCann and
Cornerstone Realty.75 Applying the primary line of business test to the facts
of the case, the court reasoned that:
The subject transaction involved the Seven Oaks' acquisition
64 McCann, 890 A.2d at 163 n.30.
65 Id.
' See id. at 164 ("We accordingly conclude that a CUTPA violation may not be alleged for
activities that are incidental to an entity's primary trade or commerce.").
67 Id.
68 Id.
6 977 A.2d 228 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
70 Id at 235.
71 Id
7 21 Id. at 236.
" Id. at 237.
7s Id.
7 1Id at 238.
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of the defendant's mortgage loan and note from Sovereign
Bank, the forbearance agreement that Seven Oaks entered into
with the defendant and conduct between the parties during the
period of forbearance. There was no evidence presented at trial
that Seven Oaks ever had, prior to the transaction or thereafter,
engaged in the mortgage business, nor did the defendant allege
as much. The defendant's allegations solely related to an
ancillary transaction that was incidental to the Seven Oaks'
primary real estate business and thus fell outside the CUTPA
penumbra.1 6
The court then reversed the CUTPA judgement and vacated the damages
award.77 Some view this case as a potential limitation on the utility of
CUTPA."
However, soon after Sovereign Bank, for the first time the Appellate
Court applied CUTPA's primary line of business test favorably to a plaintiff
in Landmark Investment Group, LLC v. Chung Family Realty Partnership,
LLC.79 In Landmark, a defendant purchased commercial property with the
intent to develop the area into a restaurant, but environmental cleanup
proved to be too costly.so The plaintiff entered into an agreement to buy the
property, with the deal contingent on either the defendant securing
brownfields funding from the town or providing the funds to remediate the
environmental issues on its own."' A new environmental assessment
revealed that the initial appraisal overestimated the cleanup costs by
approximately one million dollars, prompting the town to deny brownfields
funding. 2 A third party soon after made a more favorable offer to buy the
property." The defendant, citing the lack of brownfields funding, attempted
to cancel its deal with the plaintiff, and entered into a contract to sell the
property to the third party instead.84 The trial court ordered specific
performance of the defendant's contract with the plaintiff and granted
76 Id.
7 7 Id. at 238-39.
78 See LANGER ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.2, at 115 ("This decision is significant for establishing an
even narrower definition for 'trade or commerce' than did McCann. In McCann, the conduct at issue
related to sale of real property, a transaction that had only an incidental connection to the regular business
of selling and servicing automobiles. In Sovereign Bank, although the conduct appeared to be of a form
that was new to Seven Oaks, it occurred in a transaction involving real property, which was closely
related to business of a type in which the party had previously engaged. Further, the relevant conduct
was seemingly for the purpose of profit as an ongoing aspect of that business.").
" 10 A.3d 61 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010); see also LANGER ETAL., supra note 1, § 3.2, at 116 (explaining
how the Landmark decision "could be an important basis for an expanded application of CUTPA").
"o Landmark, 10 A.3d at 68.
si Id. at 68-69.
82 Id. at 69.
8 Id. at 70.
4 Id. at 70-71.
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attorneys' fees on a CUTPA claim.85
On appeal, the defendant relied on McCann to argue that the sale of the
real estate was incidental to the primary business because its owner was a
"lifelong restaurateur."86 The Appellate Court, in an emerging trend, took no
issue with the primary line of business test, summarily citing McCann and
Sovereign Bank.87 The court did not agree with the defendant's factual
application of the standard however, noting that "[w]e find no support in
McCann ... for the proposition that the sale of assets of an unprofitable
business is incidental to that business."88 The court went on to find that,
although Chung himself was a restaurateur, the defendant-entity's articles of
organization provided that "its purposes [were] 'to acquire, manage, lease,
and develop real property and related assets."' 8 From these facts, the court
was easily able to conclude "that real estate development was the
defendant's main commercial endeavor," and upheld the plaintiff s CUTPA
verdict.9 0
The latest Appellate Court case to address this doctrine-DiNardo
Seaside Tower, Ltd. v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp.9 1 -contained the most
detailed look into the legal justification for the primary line of business test
so far. In DiNardo, the plaintiff leased industrial property to the defendant
for use in manufacturing H-66 Comanche helicopters for the United States
Army. 92 After the plaintiff inspected the property following the conclusion
of the lease, it thought that several improper modifications were made and
that the property had not been properly maintained.93 These allegations led
the landlord to commence an action against the former tenant for breach of
the lease agreement.9 4
In the second count of the complaint, the plaintiff alleged a violation of
CUTPA, claiming "that employees of the defendant had vandalized the
" Id. at 71.
6 Id. at 79.
87 Id.
K8 Id.
8 Id.
90 Id.
" 100 A.3d 413 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014).
92 1d. at 418-19.
9 See id at 420 ("Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant improperly had removed
telecommunications, data and electrical power wiring, had cut wires, had disabled the telephone system
to the point that a replacement was necessary, had disabled the energy management, security and fire
alarm systems that had been connected to an off-site property owned by the defendant, had disabled the
card access aspect of the security system, had removed security cameras and had cut various pipes
throughout the building. The plaintiff further alleged that, in breach of the lease agreement, the defendant
had failed to maintain the property, including failing to clean and caulk thermal windows, which allowed
water to damage the building and caused the DryVit stucco exterior to fail, and failing to maintain the
parking lot and sidewalks.").
9 Id
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interior of the buildings and removed property belonging to the plaintiff." 95
The plaintiff believed that the defendant intentionally committed these acts
to make the property uninhabitable until a significant number of repairs
could be made.96 At the conclusion of the plaintiffs case, the trial court
granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict as to the CUTPA count,
ruling that the defendant was not "in the trade or commerce of renting or
leasing properties and its 'true business' was the manufacture and servicing
of aviation equipment." 97
The plaintiff first argued that the trial court erred in applying McCann
instead of considering the plain language of CUTPA." It attempted to
characterize McCann's adoption of the primary line of business test from
Arawana Mills and Cornerstone Realty as dicta." The Appellate Court
traced the history of the case law in reviewing this assertion, analyzing
Arawana Mills, McCann, and Sovereign Bank." After some discussion
regarding the factual background of all three cases, the Appellate Court
rejected the plaintiffs contention.' They swiftly reaffirmed McCann,
stating that it was "controlling and applicable precedent."l02 Interestingly,
the court expressed an unwillingness to revisit the McCann decision unless
an appeal is heard en banc.103 The plaintiffs other two arguments for
reversing the CUTPA directed verdict were also unsuccessful.' 04
To date, the Connecticut Supreme Court has been largely silent on the
primary line of business issue. The court denied certification in McCann,'o
Sovereign Bank,'06 Landmark,"o7 and DiNardo.'os The one potential
exception occurred in Tzovolos v. Wiseman. '10 In Tzovolos, the defendants
appealed from a number of trial court findings, including that they violated
95 id
9 Id. at 420, 423.
" Id. at 421; see id. at 423 (relying on McCann to reach its determination).
9' Id. at 424, 426 n.5.
9 Id. at 426.
00 Id. at 424-26.
.o. See id. at 426 ("Simply put, [the primary line of business analysis] was the express holding of
the case, and not dicta as claimed by the plaintiff.").
102 Id.
'
03 Id. at 426 n.5.
" See id. at 427-28 (declining to review the merits of the plaintiff's claim that the court improperly
raised the primary line of business issue sua sponte and upholding the trial court's determination that
renting or leasing property was not in the defendant's primary line of business, despite the defendant's
worldwide real estate activities).
1os McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 895 A.2d 798
(Conn. 2006).
0 Sovereign Bank v. Licata, 981 A.2d 1080 (Conn. 2009) (granting certification on different
grounds).
i" Landmark Inv. Grp., LLC v. Chung Family Realty P'ship, LLC, 13 A.3d I100 (Conn. 2011).
1os DiNardo Seaside Tower, Ltd. v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 103 A.3d 976 (Conn. 2014).
'` 12 A.3d 563 (Conn. 2011) (per curiam).
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CUTPA."o The Connecticut Supreme Court took the case on direct
appeal."' The court went on to simply affirm all of the prior judgments by
fully adopting "the trial court's well reasoned decision as a statement of the
facts and the applicable law on those issues."ll 2
The trial court's opinion did cite to McCann yet found the conduct
complained of as being within the defendants' primary line of business." 3
Some believe that the blanket affirmation in Tzovolos signals the Supreme
Court's approval of McCann, and therefore approval of the primary line of
business limitation on trade or commerce under CUTPA.' 14 However, the
door is likely still open for a legal challenge to McCann and its progeny
because the Supreme Court's opinion does not expressly mention the
primary line of business test at all and other courts have largely ignored the
decision."' Additionally, the Superior Court issued its decision before
Sovereign Bank, Landmark, and DiNardo further developed the law." 6 It is
more likely that because of the variety of issues presented in the complex
underlying cases, the Supreme Court at the time only assumed that the.
primary line of business doctrine existed and agreed with the trial court's
reasoning. 1 17
C. McCann's Flaws
Since its humble beginnings in Colonial Motors, the primary line of
Io Id. at 565-66.
"I Id. at 565 n.]1.
112 Id. at 566.
"3 Tzovolos v. Wiseman, 16 A.3d 819, 849-50 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007), af'd, 12 A.3d 563 (Conn.
2011).
114 See LANGER ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.2, at 108, 118 (arguing that "Tzovolos seems to be an
important and controlling decision").
"1 Tzovolos, 12 A.3d at 563-66; LANGER ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.2, at 118 n.36.
"1 As explained supra, Sovereign Bank appears to have broadened the limitation on the definition
of trade or commerce. See Sovereign Bank v. Licata, 977 A.2d 228, 238 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009)
(contending that just because a business is primarily involved in real estate does not mean that it is
primarily involved with purchasing mortgages and loaning money for the purposes of CUTPA). This
highly formalistic analysis, which looks at each business activity narrowly, appears contrary to a
conclusion partially relied upon by the Tzovolos lower court that "a part of most businesses' commerce
is the borrowing or providing of capital, the giving or taking of security interests and dealing honestly
and in a nonpreferential manner to creditors of an insolvent entity. These acts are within the primary
scope of business and, therefore, are subject to CUTPA." Tzovolos, 16 A.3d at 850. The Tzovolos lower
court opinion was issued in 2007, Sovereign Bank came out in 2009, and the Connecticut Supreme Court
did not affirm Tzovolos until 2011. The Landmark decision was also announced during this period in
2010. While application of the Sovereign Bank standard would likely hurt the Tzovolos plaintiffs,
Landmark would likely be helpful because the case also contained a defendant found to have acted in
bad faith. See infra Section IIt (arguing that past precedent can alternatively be analyzed by the scope of
the conduct). One could reasonably wonder how the Supreme Court failed to identify any of the apparent
inconsistencies or similarities between Tzovolos and the new appellate authority.
"' See Tzovolos, 12 A.3d at 566 ("It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat [the trial court's]
discussion here.").
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business test has grown into a practical obstacle that many litigants must
undertake."' A plaintiff bringing a CUTPA lawsuit in state or federal court
should be prepared for a primary line of business challenge." 9 This reality
is justified considering the number of Appellate Court decisions issued on
the subject. 12 0 However, while the common law system is based on the
principle of stare decisis in order to ensure slow development of the law and
promote the value of predictability, the downside to such a structure is that
it can become difficult to challenge a past erroneous decision that is
subsequently relied on repeatedly. 12 1
The primary line of business test is an example of this phenomenon.
McCann is the fundamental case that first confirmed that the primary line of
business test applies to CUTPA, resolving the split at the Superior Court
level. 12 2 Every Appellate Court decision that followed relied on the holding
from McCann.123 The problem, as referred to above, is that each of these
cases blindly accepted the legal conclusion from McCann without
question. 124 Some of the blame for this oversight is fairly attributable to the
litigants for not raising the issue' 2 5 -although the motivation for challenging
McCann understandably grows weaker as more cases supporting it are
releasedl 26 -but the Appellate Court should be held at least equally
responsible for failing to address the issue when it is raised, as it was in
DiNardo.127
" For a non-exhaustive list of some of the cases that raise the primary line of business issue, see
LANGER ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.2, at 112-14 n.l 8.
"' The primary line of business defense is an issue of law to be decided by the court. E.g., Biro v.
Matz, 33 A.3d 742, 754 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
120 See supra Section I.B (discussing the development of state precedent).
121 See, e.g., State v. Peeler, 140 A.3d 811, 852-57 (Conn. 2016) (Zarella, J., dissenting) (explaining
why the different forms of reliance play a significant role in the stare decisis calculus). Compare id. at
814 (Rogers, C.J., concurring) (arguing that the court cannot overrule past precedent, regardless of how
erroneous it is, if doing so "would inflict far greater damage on the public perception of the rule of law
and the stability and predictability" of the court as an institution), with id. at 890 (Espinosa, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original) (criticizing the outcome of the case because "a fundamental principle underlying
the doctrine of stare decisis [is] that the doctrine, although grounded in stability and consistency, cannot
be rigid. Otherwise, consistency and stability would require the court to follow precedent regardless of
how wrong it may be").
122 McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 890 A.2d 140,
164 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
123 See supra Section II.B (discussing the appellate cases following McCann).
124 See supra Section Il.B.
125 See Blumberg Assocs. Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Conn., Inc., 84 A.3d 840, 869
(Conn. 2014) ("[O]ur system is an adversarial one in which the burden ordinarily is on the parties to
frame the issues, and the presumption is that issues not raised by the parties are deemed waived.").
126 This might be a case of "post hoc, ergo propter hoc" reasoning. See Post hoc ergo propter hoc,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining this phrase as "[t]he logical fallacy of assuming
that a causal relationship exists when acts or events are merely sequential").
127 See DiNardo Seaside Tower, Ltd. v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 100 A.3d 413, 426 n.5 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2014) (declining to revisit the McCann holding).
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McCann violated many well-settled judicial philosophies. The
Appellate Court adopted the primary line of business test as the law in
Connecticut, despite neither party first being asked to brief the issue.12 1 In
contrast, the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to take up perhaps the
most evident and controversial issue under CUTPA-whether the
appropriate standard for unfairness should remain the three-prong cigarette
rule or switch to the narrower substantial injury test used under federal
law-because parties fail to adequately present the matter. 129 Even when the
defendant in Artie's Auto Body, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.130
properly preserved this important issue on appeal, the Supreme Court still
declined to reach the question, acknowledging that it would eventually have
to address the conflict unless the legislature takes action.' 31 The McCann
court should have used this conservative approach-refraining from
deciding a matter of first impression under CUTPA until the opposing
theories can be effectively balanced against each other-to defer the primary
line of business issue.
The plaintiffs in McCann, if given the chance, could have cited the
various precedents in existence at the time (cases that the McCann court
somehow disregarded) that found fault with the primary line of business
test. 13 2 The adversarial design of the judicial system helps protect the court
128 McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 890 A.2d 140,
163 n.30 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
129 See Ulbrich v. Groth, 78 A.3d 76, 108-09, 112 (Conn. 2013) (emphasis in original) ("[T]he
defendants argue[ [that] the trial court improperly instructed the jury that the cigarette rule applied to
the plaintiffs' CUTPA claim, and it should have instructed the jury in accordance with the standard
applied by the federal courts... . [However], the defendants neither requested that the trial court instruct
the jury in accordance with current federal law applicable to unfair trade practices insteadof the cigarette
rule, nor excepted to the instruction given by the trial court on that ground. ... In the present case, we
see no exceptional circumstances that would militate in favor of reviewing the defendants' unpreserved
claim that the cigarette rule should be abandoned in favor of the substantial unjustified injury test.
Accordingly, we conclude that the claim is not reviewable."); Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc., 873 A.2d 929,
959 n.34 (Conn. 2005) ("Although we consistently have followed the cigarette rule in CUTPA cases, we
also note that, when interpreting 'unfairness' under CUTPA, our decisions are to be guided by the
interpretations of the Federal Trade Act by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts.....
Review of those authorities indicates that a serious question exists as to whether the cigarette rule remains
the guiding rule utilized under federal law. . . . Because, in the present case, neither party has raised or
briefed this issue, and both have briefed the issue applying the cigarette rule, we decline to address the
issue of the viability of the cigarette rule until it squarely has been presented to us."); see also Naples v.
Keystone Bldg. & Dev. Corp., 990 A.2d 326, 343 (Conn. 2010) (Zarella, J., concurring) (explaining that
although there appears to be tension between the Connecticut and federal standards on unfairness, "it is
also my view that the case presently before us would not be the appropriate case to take on such a review
of our precedent, and, therefore, any such review must be left to a future case").
1o 119 A.3d 1139 (Conn. 2015).
131 Id. at 1149-50 n.13.
132 See, e.g., Metcoffv. NCT Grp., Inc., No. X04CV040184701S, 2005 WL 288769, at *4 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2005) ("The CUTPA statute by its terms is not limited to acts or practices conducted
in a defendant's principal business."); Duncan v. PEH I, No. CV020817088S, 2003 WL 1962789, at *3
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2003) ("[U]nless otherwise determined by the legislature or appellate authority,
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from making mistakes of law.' 33 Unfortunately, this significant check was
not available in McCann, and the resulting opinion is deficient. The court
based its holding on the same one reached in Arawana Mills and
Cornerstone Realty, yet failed to trace where that holding originated from.1 34
Cornerstone Realty relied on Arawana Mills, but Arawana Mills relied
solely on Colonial Motors.'
If the McCann court cited Colonial Motors, it would have noticed that
the foundation of what would come to be known as the "primary line of
business" doctrine was initially used as a means of dismissing a CUTPA
action by a retailer against a consumer.' 36 The federal court was concerned
about the lack of state court guidance at the time regarding this issue.1 37
Contrary to what Arawana Mills and Cornerstone Realty extrapolated from
the case, Colonial Motors did not adopt a "primary line of business" test.
Rather, properly placed in context, the case stands as an example of the early
reservations regarding the breadth of CUTPA and judiciary's attempt to
limit the class of cases brought under it to avoid overreach.1 38 Thus, adopting
the 'business context' test is the applicable standard to apply to CUTPA claims."); Feen v. Benefit Plan
Adm'rs, Inc., No. 406726, 2000 WL 1398898, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2000) ("In keeping with
the broad remedial nature of CUTPA and the direction of the Connecticut Supreme Court to look to the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in determining the scope of CUTPA, this court holds that an
unfair or deceptive act or practice committed in a 'business context,' may fall within the coverage of
General Statutes § 42-1 10b(a) as being an 'unfair or deceptive [act] or [practice] in the conduct of any
trade or commerce' even if it is incidental to the defendant's business."); Kay v. Seiden, No. CV
940048587S, 1999 WL 596601, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 30, 1999) ("The court concludes that the
'business context' test was an appropriate standard to apply to determine whether CUTPA was applicable
to the facts of this case . . . .").
133 See Blumberg Assocs. Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Conn., Inc., 84 A.3d 840, 858
(Conn. 2014) ("The justifications for the adversarial system are 'that self-interested adversaries will
uncover and present more useful information and arguments to the decision maker than would be
developed by the judicial officer in an inquisitorial system . . . .' (quoting Adam A. Milani & Michael
R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV.
245, 282 (2002))).
"' McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 890 A.2d 140,
163 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
135 See supra Section H.A (discussing the court's reasoning in Cornerstone Realty and Arawana
Mills).
' See Colonial Motors, Inc. v. N.Y. Design Grp., Inc., Civil No. H-86-206 (AHN), slip op. at 5
(D. Conn. June 20, 1986) ("Here, the complaint alleges that defendant leased one automobile from
plaintiff, but does not allege defendant was in the trade or commerce involving the leasing of
automobiles. Further, despite CUTPA's broad coverage, plaintiffs counsel conceded at oral argument
that she knew of no case where a retailer has sued a customer for a violation of CUTPA. The court's
research confirms counsel's concession. This court is persuaded that the leasing of one automobile by a
consumer who is not involved in the trade or business of leasing automobiles, does not constitute
'conduct of any trade or commerce."').
' See id. at 6 ("Of the numerous Connecticut state court decisions dealing with CUTPA claims,
no case involved a retailer suing its customer for a violation of CUTPA. Therefore, this court is
disinclined to permit plaintiffto proceed with its CUTPA claim.").
' In the twenty years between Colonial Motors and McCann, state Superior Courts came out
differently on the issue of whether CUTPA can apply in the reverse. Compare D'Albero v. Vailette, No.
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the broader holding that Arawana Mills and Cornerstone Realty derived
from Colonial Motors was misplaced. It defies logical reasoning for a
federal court to dismiss an action because there are no state court
interpretations on the matter, and then later have the state appellate court
indirectly adopt the federal court's decision without a discussion as to the
underlying reasons why, because both the language and the intent of the
statute are ignored in both instances.13 9
Instead of using the traditional tools of statutory analysis, the McCann
court defended its conclusion by citing to the legislature's inaction in
amending CUTPA since Arawana Mills and Cornerstone Realty.140 This
faulty approach relates to the court's violation of a second fundamental
CV NH-9112-4940, 1992 WL 389824, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 25, 1992) ("Allowing CUTPA
actions by retailers and manufacturers against their customers, or by lending institutions against their
borrowers, or by landlords against their tenants would be to stand CUTPA on its head. Statutory
protections intended to place customers on more equal commercial footing with the business community
would be grossly transmuted into a weapon of industry, to be used at will against the consuming public."),
with Conning Corp. v. Davenport Grp., No. CV91 0115140 S, 1992 WL 98135, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Apr. 30, 1992) ("The restrictive application urged by the defendants would have disastrous practical
consequences. For instance, it would prevent a merchandise seller who has been cheated through the
deceptive acts of a purchaser from utilizing the full arsenal of remedies afforded by CUTPA. Such a
result would be inconsistent with the remedial purpose of the statute."). This question still appears to be
unresolved. See Petra Constr. Co. v. Sacred Heart Univ., No. XO3HHDCVO96013738S, 2011 WL
2536196, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 26, 2011) ("There is a split of authority among trial courts as to
whether a seller of goods or services may assert a CUTPA claim against a purchaser or consumer of those
goods and services.... This court ... agrees with those courts which have held that a seller of goods or
services like the plaintiff here may assert a CUTPA claim against a purchaser or consumer of those goods
and services."); LANGER ET AL., supra note 1, §§ 3.1, 3.6, at 105, 198-201 (referencing the split of
authority). Perhaps this omission is because the primary line of business doctrine has become the
predominant concern litigants raise after McCann. Compare DiNardo Seaside Tower, Ltd. v. Sikorsky
Aircraft Corp., 100 A.3d 413, 421 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014) (addressing the plaintiffs primary line of
business arguments, but failing to consider that the case involved a landlord suing a former commercial
tenant), with Trigo Family, LLC v. Avery, No. CV044000712S, 2005 WL 1273922, at *1-2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. May 3, 2005) ("The fundamental argument is that although CUTPA may be applied to
landlord-tenant situations, it has never been permitted in an action by a landlord against a tenant.... All
that is alleged here is that the defendants rented the premises from the plaintiffs, that they failed to pay
the rent due, and that they caused certain enumerated items of damage to the premises. If such allegations
could turn an action by a landlord against a commercial tenant into a CUTPA claim, virtually all landlord-
tenant actions against commercial tenants would become CUTPA cases."). Either way, the fear of
CUTPA applying in "reverse" scenarios and thus being used too broadly is the foundation of the primary
line of business test. However, this fear can best be mitigated by looking at the scope of the alleged
conduct, not at who the parties are. See infra Section Ill (analyzing the relationship between the primary
line of business test, a CUTPA claim, and a breach of contract claim).
.. See supra Section 1; see also Feen v. Benefit Plan Adm'rs, Inc., No. 406726,2000 WL 1398898,
at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2000) ("Neither Colonial Motors, Inc. v. New York Design Group, Inc. .
. . nor the subsequent cases following it, cited any independent support or rationale for the proposition
that an unfair or deceptive act or practice is not actionable if it relates only to an incidental business
activity rather than to the defendant's primary business activity.").
" McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 890 A.2d 140,
164 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
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judicial tenet: "Connecticut is the final arbiter of its own laws."l41 The
McCann court could have chosen to consider the federal precedent, but was
under no obligation to accept those holdings as binding.' 42 The legislature
could have reasonably not taken action because they were waiting for a
Connecticut appellate-level court to determine if the primary line of business
test even existed under CUTPA.1 4 3 The court undermined its legislative
acquiescence argument by observing that "[t]he question of whether a
CUTPA claim may arise out of a transaction that is not the alleged offender's
primary trade or business has not been addressed by Connecticut's appellate
courts."'" If Connecticut state courts are the "final arbiters" of Connecticut
law, and there was no state appellate authority at the time on the matter, it
reasonably follows that the legislature should not have been "presumed to
be aware ofjudgments that construe [the] statute[]."l45
It has been ten years since McCann, and the primary line of business test
has been reaffirmed several times by the Appellate Court, 146 perhaps
signaling the legislature's eventual acceptance of the policy. However, this
subsequent observation ignores the fact that it was improper for the McCann
court to rely on legislative indifference in the first place. Additionally, the
legislature might still be waiting for a statement on the issue from the
Connecticut Supreme Court, notwithstanding Tzovolos.147 The holes in the
court's legislative theory, taken together with a comprehensive evaluation
of the prior case law, strip McCann of any other substantive reason
supporting the primary line of business test.
Finally, the McCann court disrupted one of the most widely recognized
rules on judicial scrutiny: courts should issue decisions on the narrowest
' See Vollemans v. Town of Wallingford, 928 A.2d 586, 588-89, 594 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007),
aff'd, 956 A.2d 579 (Conn. 2008) (quoting Johnson v. Manson, 493 A.2d 846, 852 (Conn. 1985)) (failing
to apply the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal antidiscrimination statute to a
portion of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act as a matter of state law); id. at 594 n.10 ("In
interpreting our statutes and deciding this question of first impression as a matter of Connecticut law, we
are free to depart from that federal statutory interpretation upon concluding that it fails to effectuate both
the legislative policy underlying the statute at issue and the remedial nature thereof. . . ."). It is true that
CUTPA requires Connecticut courts to look at federal decisions for guidance, but only to the extent that
those decisions interpret the FTC Act. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-11 Ob(b) (2016). In contrast, the McCann
court relied on federal precedent that interpreted the state statute, even though it had no duty to consider
those interpretations.
142 Vollemans, 928 A.2d at 594. This argument is strengthened when considering that the reasoning
rejected in Vollemans came from the United States Supreme Court, while the opinions that the McCann
court relied on came from the lower, district court level.
143 Both state and federal trial courts were applying two different standards in the post-Arawana
Mills but pre-McCann era, and the legislature likely wanted some firm authority on the state of the law
before acting. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (discussing the standards).
'" McCann, 890 A.2d at 163.
41 Id. at 164.
i" See supra Section H.B (highlighting the Appellate Court cases following McCann).
14 See supra Section II.B (discussing the relevance of Tzovolos).
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ground possible.'4 8 The plaintiff in DiNardo unsuccessfully argued that the
primary line of business discussion in McCann was dicta because the trial
court never considered the issue. 14 9 To get around this problem, the McCann
court referenced its "supervisory powers,"so declaring that a review of the
applicable law was required "in order that justice may be done.""' This
argument has no merit.152
An appellate-level court may decide an unpreserved issue if it involves
subject matter jurisdiction, the plain-error doctrine, or a constitutional claim
if certain conditions are met.153 Appellate tribunals may also consider
unpreserved claims raised by a party for the first time on appeal pursuant to
their supervisory powers if: 1) the record is adequate for review and there is
148 See, e.g., Artie's Auto Body, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 119 A.3d 1139, 1149-50 n.13 (Conn.
2015) (deciding the CUTPA issue on the narrower ground); Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59
DUKE L.J. 447, 509 (2009) ("[A] court has no reason to raise issues that are tangential to or distinct from
the claims that the parties have asked the court to decide, because in these cases its opinion will not
mislead others or create flawed precedent.").
' DiNardo Seaside Tower, Ltd. v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 100 A.3d 413, 426 (Conn. App. Ct.
2014).
150 See Lapointe v. Comm'r of Corr., 112 A.3d 1, 134 (Conn. 2015) (Espinosa, J., dissenting) ("On
the one hand, our supervisory powers serve an essential purpose, reflecting our recognition that, although
the rule of law ensures justice within the legal system, there are some instances when justice is more
properly aligned with principles of equity. In those rare instances, the uniformity of legal rules must yield
to equity, thereby achieving justice. On the other hand, our extraordinary authority to act outside the
limits of the rule of law is unquestionably a 'great power,' one that carries with it both great risk and
attendant responsibility. Our supervisory authority allows us to reach down and announce a rule or result
from on high. As the highest court in the state, once we have invoked that authority, our use of it is
virtually unreviewable-with few exceptions, we are answerable only to ourselves. Accordingly, because
of the lack of outside checks on that power, we have a duty to resort to that authority only when we
must-disciplining ourselves to rely on it rarely. Otherwise, we risk injecting arbitrariness and
capriciousness into the rule of law.").
" McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 890 A.2d 140,
163 n.30 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
152 See Blumberg Assocs. Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Conn., Inc., 84 A.3d 840, 867
(Conn. 2014) ("[W]e emphasize that a general statement by a reviewing court that the review of an
unpreserved claim is warranted in the interests ofjustice between the parties or because no party will be
prejudiced is not alone sufficient."); see also id. at n.32 ("Courts have decided cases sua sponte to avoid
a miscarriage of justice or to prevent a result inconsistent with substantial justice. Unfortunately, these
phrases are almost meaningless, because any time the new issue would affect the result, it could be a
miscarriage ofjustice for the party that lost below not to be permitted to raise the issue." (quoting Barry
A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants ofan Opportunity to Be Heard,
39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1285 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
153 Id. at 859-60. Subject matter jurisdiction and constitutional concerns were not at issue in
McCann. The plain-error doctrine requires a reviewing court to make an express finding that either "the
error [was] so obvious that it affect[ed] the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial
proceedings" or that "the error is indeed plain in the sense that it is patent [or] readily [discernible] on
the face of a factually adequate record, [and] also .. .obvious in the sense of not debatable," combined
with a demonstration "that the failure to grant relief will result in manifest injustice." Id. at 861-63
(alterations in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The McCann court could
not justify a plain error review and had to rely on its supervisory powers instead because the case was
not one that had significant public attention or one in which the trial court made a facially-obvious error.
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no need for further trial court proceedings; 2) all parties have an opportunity
to be heard on the issue; and 3) no party suffers unfair prejudice. 15 4
Additionally, supervisory powers require a showing that: 1) the opposing
party does not contest the decision to review the issue; 2) the party who
raises the unpreserved claim cannot prevail; or 3) "the exceptional
circumstances of the case ... justify a deviation from the general rule that
unpreserved claims will not be reviewed."" A court's decision to raise an
unpreserved issue sua sponte demands the same analysis.1 6
In McCann, the primary line of business issue was unpreserved, as the
trial court did not consider it."' Whether one sentence in the defendant's
appellate brief is enough evidence to support the notion that the defendant
actually intended to raise the primary line of business issue on appeal is
irrelevant because the same prerequisites apply to unpreserved claims raised
by parties and unpreserved claims raised sua sponte by the court.1 ss
Regardless of which standard ultimately applies, the McCann court abused
its power.
First, the factual record was likely not complete because the plaintiffs
did not get an opportunity to fully establish what the defendants' primary
business activities consisted of. Second, as stated above, the plaintiffs were
not given an opportunity to adequately brief the primary line of business
issue.'59 The Appellate Court should have ordered supplemental briefing
from both parties or at least put them on notice that the topic might come up
at oral argument.' 6 0 Third, the plaintiffs were prejudiced because they likely
would have proceeded differently had the trial court raised the primary line
14 Id. at 863-64.
' Id. at 865, 867.
16 Id. at 867-69.
1" McCann Real Equities Series XXf[, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 890 A.2d 140,
163 n.30 (Conn. 2006).
." See Matos v. Ortiz, 144 A.3d 425,435 n.8 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016) (citing Blumberg, 84 A.3d at
867-68) ("Our Supreme Court has held that the standard for reviewing an unpreserved issue that was
raised on appeal is identical to the standard for reviewing an unpreserved issue that was not raised on
appeal.").
'' See Lapointe v. Comm'r of Corr., 112 A.3d 1, 112 (Conn. 2015) (Zarella, J., dissenting) ("Due
process compels [appellate courts] to give the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard.... The
significance of certain evidence may not be obvious to [the court] from [its] own, unguided review of
such a voluminous record. The parties have greater knowledge of the evidence in the record and how it
got there. They also have a more complete perspective of the context in which evidence was presented
and its import. Facts viewed in isolation are not as powerful as facts woven into a coherent and
compelling argument. That is the purpose ofbriefing. By denying the parties notice and a chance to brief
the issue that the court decides, [the court] may be silencing valid arguments not obvious from [its] own
review. Even if that briefing does not change the majority's conclusions, the losing party deserves the
solace of knowing that it has been fairly heard.").
'" See State v. Connor, 138 A.3d 265, 277 (Conn. 2016) (emphasizing the importance of
supplemental briefing and "time to review the record ... to conduct research, and to prepare a response").
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issue.' Fourth, although it can be argued that the plaintiffs did not object to
the Appellate Court's review because their reply brief ignored the primary
line issue entirely, McCann was not an "exceptional case" that demanded
review. 162 While the final part of the supervisory powers framework is a
disjunctive test, the first part is conjunctive, meaning that the McCann
decision cannot be justified under modem jurisprudence.1 63
Part of the basis for appeal in McCann was the grant of the defendants'
motion for a directed verdict as to the CUTPA claim." The Superior Court
found that no reasonable jury could conclude that alleged misrepresentations
made by the defendants were the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the
plaintiffs.16' The Appellate Court, in other sections of its opinion, upheld the
trial court's findings regarding the causation problem as applied to different
claims. 166 Therefore, the McCann court should have simply affirmed the trial
court's CUTPA decision in a few sentences. 67 "Justice" did not require a
review of the primary line of business test; the defendant won under that
theory but also would have won had the Appellate Court affirmed using the
trial court's causation-based reasoning-a task that the McCann court
already demonstrated a willingness to accept. Instead, the McCann case has
become a prime example of legislating from the bench.'16  The Connecticut
Supreme Court should recognize the faults in McCann and take action to
remedy the situation.
161 See Blumberg, 84 A.3d at 864 ("Prejudice may be found, for example, when a party demonstrates
that it would have presented additional evidence or that it otherwise would have proceeded differently if
the claim had been raised at trial.").
162 See id. at 865-66 (citing a non-exhaustive list of factors that may make a case exceptional,
including public character, intervening change in the law, newly-established undisputed facts, avoidance
of a constitutional question, alternative basis for affirming an evidentiary ruling, and judicial bias).
163 A reviewing court can issue an unpreserved, alternative ground for affirming a lower court if the
appellant's claim would require a remand because judicial economy would be preserved. Id at 870. This
would be the case in McCann because if the directed verdict was reversed as appellant advocated, the
CUTPA claim would need to be sent back down to ajury. Still, "the record must be adequate for review,
and all parties must be provided with an opportunity to address the unpreserved issue." Id. at n.38.
1" McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 890 A.2d 140,
162 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
165 Id
16 6 See id. at 155-57, 159 (regarding the breach of contract, negligent and reckless misrepresentation
claims).
161 See Blumberg, 84 A.3d at 868 n.35 ("Unless ... [a] new issue is so closely intertwined with the
issue raised on appeal that the reviewing court cannot avoid addressing it . . . the reviewing court
ordinarily can avoid creating bad precedent when the parties have failed to identify an issue or
misconstrued the law by deciding the issue 'in accordance with the parties' view of the law, but . .. not[e]
that the parties had failed to raise key issues that might have produced a different holding,' thereby
signaling 'to future litigants to be sure to argue the point."' (quoting Amanda Frost, The Limits of
Advocacy, 59 DuKE L.J. 447, 473 (2009))).
1' See, e.g., Lapointe v. Comm'r of Corr., 112 A.3d 1, 132 (Conn. 2015) (Espinosa, J., dissenting)
(arguing that sua sponte review of a claim not adequately addressed by the parties violates a 'bedrock
principle' . . . and blur[s] the line between judging and advocacy").
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III. CUTPA & BREACH OF CONTRACT
One area where the Connecticut Supreme Court has provided more
guidance than with the primary line of business test involves the relationship
between a CUTPA claim and a simple breach of contract claim. For the first
time in Naples v. Keystone Building & Development Corp.,169 the Supreme
Court accepted a long-standing principle relied on by many lower courts that
"not every contractual breach rises to the level of a CUTPA violation."l70
The general philosophy supporting this pronouncement is that because the
statutory tort contains an assortment of available damages that would not
traditionally be available under a common law breach of contract claim, the
legislature could not have meant to preempt such a large and historic body
of law without expressly saying so. "' To help differentiate between the two
causes of action, the Naples Court adopted the following standard: "In the
absence of aggravating unscrupulous conduct, mere incompetence [in
failing to perform a contract] does not by itself mandate a trial court to find
a CUTPA violation."l72
The Supreme Court expounded this rule in Ulbrich v. Groth,7" stating
that the focus is
on whether the defendant's breach of contract [is] merely
negligent or incompetent, in which case the CUTPA claim [is]
barred, or whether the defendant's actions would support a
finding of intentional, reckless, unethical or unscrupulous
conduct, in which case the contractual breach will support a
CUTPA claim under the second prong of the cigarette rule.1 74
Thus, plaintiffs should allege aggravating factors in their complaints with as
much specificity as possible in order to elevate contractual actions into
CUTPA territory and have the best chances of surviving preliminary
motions."' Ulbrich independently held that the economic loss doctrine,
which ordinarily prevents a double recovery by barring the award of tort
damages in contract actions that result only in economic loss, does not apply
to certain CUTPA claims because the statute "was intended to provide a
'6 990 A.2d 326 (Conn. 2010).
"o Id. at 337 (quoting Hudson United Bank v. Cinnamon Ridge Corp., 845 A.2d 417, 428 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2004)); see id. (describing past cases that stand for the same proposition); LANGER ET AL., supra
note 1, § 4.3, at 379-80 (explaining the development of the "aggravating circumstances" doctrine).
171 LANGER ET AL., supra note 1, § 4.3, at 369-70. The legislature has incorporated CUTPA by
reference in over eighty statutes, thereby making CUTPA per se applicable to contracts falling under
those sections. See id. at app. E (listing the statutes).
172 Naples, 990 A.2d at 337.
173 78 A.3d 76 (Conn. 2013).
1
7 4 1d. at 100-01.
17s See LANGER ET AL., supra note 1, § 4.3, at 385-91 (considering some practical pleading
strategies).
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remedy that is separate and distinct from the remedies provided by contract
law when the defendant's contractual breach [is] accompanied by
aggravating circumstances."l 76 This result is consistent with Naples because
a plaintiff may simultaneously maintain both a breach of contract and
CUTPA action so long as there are aggravating circumstances, and if
successful on the merits of both claims the plaintiff may also recover
separate damages available under each count.
A. Merging Doctrines
The primary line of business analysis and the aggravating factors
analysis for breach of contract are similar in many ways. First, neither test
is apparent from the text of the statute. Second, there is no bright line rule
for helping courts determine when conduct is within the primary scope of
business and when it is merely incidental; likewise, there is no conclusive
rule for defining what unscrupulous conduct is or how many allegations are
required to sustain a CUTPA action. Most importantly, both analyses
function as a restriction on the definition of trade or commerce under
CUTPA, thereby limiting the reach of the statute and the class of potential
plaintiffs. However, while both doctrines carry out similar policy goals, the
aggravating unscrupulous conduct standard is legally more justifiable than
the primary line of business test.
First, the breach of contract approach actually has some support in the
statutory language-unlike the primary line of business requirement, as
demonstrated in Section I. CUTPA expressly requires Connecticut courts to
look at federal courts' interpretations of the FTC Act for guidance in
construing CUTPA.'7 7 Systemic breaches of contract or ones that cause
substantial harm to consumers are cognizable under the FTC Act;'17
however, there is no reciprocal primary line of business test under federal
law. Second, while determining what conduct rises to the level of being
"unscrupulous" can be an indefinite practice,"' it is less ambiguous than the
primary line of business test. Bad faith conduct is easier to identify than the
heavily fact-specific inquiry seeking to separate out those business activities
which are "primary" from those which are merely "incidental," and thus the
aggravating conduct approach better serves to instill predictability in the
16 Ulbrich, 78 A.3d at 100-01; see id. at 101, 101 n.31 (reiterating that the exception to the
economic loss doctrine under CUTPA is limited to cases that fall under the second prong of the cigarette
rule).
177 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42- 110b(b) (2016).
"' See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. F.T.C., 849 F.2d 1354, 1366-68 (11th Cir. 1988) (upholding the
FTC's power to determine that a breach of over 200,000 contracts was an unfair practice).
"' See Ulbrich, 78 A.3d at 110-11 n.43 (considering the defendant's argument that finding
immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous behavior is a vague and ambiguous process).
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marketplace."so Third, the Connecticut Supreme Court has already approved
of the aggravating unscrupulous conduct standard in cases like Naples and
Ulbrich, thus giving the concept stare decisis impact. In contrast, the highest
court in the state has yet to give an official opinion on the primary line of
business test, preserving an opportunity to acknowledge the Appellate
Court's errors without undermining the system's legitimacy.
This Note has argued that the primary line of business test and the case
that created it are flawed. In an effort to resolve this problem, the
Connecticut Supreme Court should look to merge the primary line of
business test into the already existing aggravating unscrupulous conduct
standard. A merger of the two doctrines can be accomplished without
upsetting much prior precedent, while also ensuring better conclusions in the
future.
B. Consistency with Prior Cases
A review of the primary line of business cases demonstrates that the
question comes up most frequently in situations involving either the
purchase and sale or lease of real estate.'"' A contract is almost always
involved in these circumstances. Even though the holdings are based on the
primary line of business test, most of the prior case law would turn out the
same way if analyzed under the aggravating unscrupulous conduct standard
instead. The Connecticut Supreme Court could justify abdicating the
primary line of business doctrine without necessarily disrespecting the entire
line of cases that came from it.
A comparison of McCann and Landmark is instructive. Both cases arose
under similar factual scenarios, as both involved environmental issues
disrupting a real estate purchase. 8 2 However, in McCann the plaintiffs were
foreclosed from maintaining a CUTPA claim, while the plaintiff in
Landmark was permitted to proceed with such a claim.' 83 These outcomes
"so Compare Tzovolos v. Wiseman, 16 A.3d 819, 850 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007), affd, 12 A.3d 563
(Conn. 2011) ("Furthermore, a part of most businesses' commerce is the borrowing or providing of
capital, the giving or taking of security interests and dealing honestly and in a nonpreferential manner to
creditors of an insolvent entity. These acts are within the primary scope of business and, therefore, are
subject to CUTPA."), with Sovereign Bank v. Licata, 977 A.2d 228, 238 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009)
(emphasis added) ("Our careful review of the record reveals uncontroverted testimony that since 2000,
Seven Oaks has been engaged in the business of real estate acquisition, including the purchase, sale and
renovation of real property.... There was no evidence presented at trial that Seven Oaks ever had, prior
to the transaction or thereafter, engaged in the mortgage business, nor did the defendant allege as
much.").
181 See supra Section Ll.A-B.
82 See Landmark Inv. Grp., LLC v. Chung Family Realty P'ship, LLC, 10 A.3d 61, 68-71 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2010) (reviewing the factual background of the case); McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC
v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 890 A.2d 140, 144-45 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (explaining the
underlying facts).
' Landmark, 10 A.3d at 79; McCann, 890 A.2d at 164.
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are consistent with the aggravating factors standard, despite neither court
addressing the subject. The complaint in McCann was largely filled with
allegations regarding breach of contract, with a CUTPA claim haphazardly
included.' 84 In contrast, the Landmark court upheld the trial court's findings
of nine specific examples of bad faith on the part of the defendant.'
Therefore, the conduct alleged in McCann could be reclassified as "merely
negligent or incompetent," while the conduct in Landmark ascended to the
level of "unscrupulous."' Tzovolos is another example of a case that could
be justified under the aggravating factors standard because bad faith conduct
was specifically found,'87 while the outcomes in Colonial Motors, Arawana
Mills, Cornerstone Realty, and Sovereign Bank would likewise remain intact
because each only contained allegations amounting to simple breach of
contract.'
C. Preventing Unfair Results
There is one case conclusion that appears to be inconsistent with the
aggravating conduct standard and it is the most recent, DiNardo. In
DiNardo, the plaintiff included many allegations in the complaint that the
defendant engaged in bad faith conduct;' "[s]pecifically, [the plaintiff]
claimed that the intentional destruction of the property constituted an unfair
trade practice and was done with malice toward the plaintiff and/or to
prevent another occupant from using the property."`0 If the DiNardo court
had analyzed the CUTPA claim related to breach of the lease agreement
under the aggravating unscrupulous conduct standard, it is likely that the
defendant's motion for directed verdict would have been vacated and the
case remanded. However, the plaintiff never received the opportunity to
have the CUTPA claim decided on the merits because the DiNardo court
used the primary line of business test to prevent the issue from going to a
jury.191
The result in DiNardo is an example of the primary line of business test
going too far. The behavior alleged in DiNardo seems to be the type of
184 See McCann, 890 A.2d at 146-48 (describing the pleadings).
'" See Landmark, 10 A.3d at 82-83 (listing all the bad faith actions).
86 Ulbrich v. Groth, 78 A.3d 76, 100 (Conn. 2013).
i" See Tzovolos v. Wiseman, 16 A.3d 819, 850 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007), af'd, 12 A.3d 563 (Conn.
2011) ("Here, Hartmann, Sr., his sons, and the entities that he controlled, dealt with creditors of Seawind
and persons holding security interest in equipment controlled by Seawind in an unscrupulous, oppressive
and immoral manner.").
See supra Section II.A-B.
See DiNardo Seaside Tower, Ltd. v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 100 A.3d 413, 420 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2014) (listing the many allegations).
19 Id.
91 Id at 426.
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conduct that CUTPA was enacted to protect against.1 9 2 Abandoning the
primary line of business test in favor of the aggravating factors standard
would give plaintiffs who allege a heightened degree of unfairness in
contract actions a chance to get in front of ajury, instead of being shut down
as a matter of law. This result will not prejudice defendants substantially, as
plaintiffs would still have the ultimate burden of proving unfairness under
the cigarette rule. The aggravating unscrupulous conduct test would better
serve to prevent future injustices than the primary line of business test.193
This is especially true in a case like DiNardo, where the plaintiff lost on the
other non-CUTPA count, and was thus left with no recovery.' 94
CONCLUSION
CUTPA is valuable tool, for those who can use it. The primary line of
business test, which asks whether unfair conduct is incidental to an alleged
violator's trade or business, serves as an unjustifiable restriction on the
definition of trade or commerce under CUTPA. The idea has no basis in the
statutory text or legislative history and the case law supporting the doctrine
suffers from numerous procedural and substantive fallacies. The
Connecticut Supreme Court should recognize this problem and merge the
primary line of business test into the aggravating unscrupulous conduct
standard, which is used for differentiating between CUTPA claims and
simple breach of contract. This outcome would reduce ambiguity by leaving
trial courts with less discretion to dismiss CUTPA actions prematurely,
while also remaining relatively consistent with precedent.
192 See Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 656 A.2d 1009, 1020 (Conn. 1995) (reviewing the
legislative history in light of the remedial nature of the statute).
" See Feen v. Benefit Plan Adm'rs, Inc., No. 406726, 2000 WL 1398898, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 7, 2000) ("[T]o limit actionable unfair acts or practices to those committed only in the course of a
defendant's principal trade could lead to irrational and bizarre results.... Suppose that a businessperson
is seeking to branch out into one or more secondary businesses and acts in a patently unfair and deceptive
manner in seeking this expansion. Is he or she to be given free reign to do so in pursuing these secondary
businesses or business lines because they are merely, at present, incidental to the primary business?");
Kay v. Seiden, No. CV 940048587S, 1999 WL 596601, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 30, 1999) ("Or to
look at it from another perspective, is the reluctance to apply the act based on the fact that a small business
is involved with an individual business person selling to other business people? If that is so, how do we
formulate a principle excluding applicability of the act to such factual circumstances and still apply it to
sale of a business or a portion of a business involving big impersonal corporations affecting large
numbers of competitors and a broad range of consumers? It cannot be done, and to say the act does not
apply to the latter case is not supportable.").
'9 DiNardo, 100 A.3d at 421.
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